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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (j) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether the trial court erred in concluding that a Rule 
60(b) motion may not be used as a vehicle to remedy an alleged 
mistake of law by the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) 
motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion in determining 
whether a movant has shown Rule 60(b) grounds. Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 456-457 (Utah App. 
2000). " 'An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the 
propriety of the denial or grant of relief,'" and thus "'is 
narrow in scope.!" Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 312 (Utah App. 
2001). However, the appellate court can "reach the merits of the 
underlying judgment from which relief was sought," to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. A decision 
premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 312 (Utah 
App. 2001) . 
2) Whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
a motion is not a proper method to extend a judgment for an 
additional eight years. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of 
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statutes and a prior judicial decision is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 
1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Billincrs v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 
P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996); State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1994). 
COURT RULE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders 
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time 
of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal 
is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is 
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a dispute of whether a judgment may be 
renewed by motion , and whether a Rule 60(b) (1) motion is the 
proper vehicle to redress an alleged mistake of law by the trial 
court. The appellant/cross-appellee ("Bybee") filed a Rule 60(b) 
motion to set aside orders of the trial court obtained by motion 
extending for an additional eight years the judgment obtained by 
appellee/cross-appellant ("Fisher"). This appeal is from the 
trial court's order denying Bybee's motion to set aside the 
orders. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
On October 6, 1992, Fisher filed a complaint against Bybee 
and others for their failure to make payments pursuant to a 
contract for the purchase of Fisher's car wash business and for 
taking funds belonging to Fisher from the business. (R. at 1-8). 
After the complaint was filed and served on the defendants, Bybee 
fought against a pre-judgment writ of garnishment but failed to 
file an answer.(R. at 36). Entry of Default was filed against 
Bybee on March 31, 1993. (R. at 64-65). And a default judgment 
was filed against Bybee on May 10, 1993. (R. at 70-71). On May 
12, 1993, notice of the entry of the default judgment was mailed 
to Bybee. (R. at 72-75). 
Fisher was unsuccessful in several attempts to collect on 
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the judgment. (R. at 86-87). Therefore, on February 8, 2001, 
Fisher filed an ex-parte motion, memorandum, and affidavit to 
extend the judgment ("ex-parte motion"). (R. at 85-90). The trial 
court issued its order extending the judgment on February 8, 
2001. (R. at 91-92). On February 12, 2001, Fisher mailed a copy 
of the ex-parte motion, memorandum, affidavit and unsigned order 
to Bybee. (R. at 161, 145-155). 
Since Bybee had not been served with the motion prior to the 
trial court issuing its order extending judgment, on February 21, 
2001, Fisher drafted and mailed a motion and memorandum and 
affidavit to extend the judgment to Bybee. (R. at 161, 137-143). 
On March 23, 2 001, Fisher again sent to Bybee a copy of the 
motion, memorandum, and affidavit to extend the judgment, 
("second motion to extend judgment")(R. at 161, 93, 95, 129-135). 
Fisher filed the second motion to extend the judgment with the 
court on March 26, 2001 (R. at 93-99). (R. at 93 & 95). Bybee 
failed to respond, and the trial court entered its order 
extending the judgment on April 17, 2001. (R. at 100-101). 
On July 15, 2001, Bybee through counsel filed a Rule 
60(b) (1) motion to set aside the February 8th and April 17th 
orders extending judgment. (R. at 106). Bybee argued that the 
orders should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) because the 
trial court committed a mistake of law by issuing an order to 
extend the judgment on a motion when a judgment can only be 
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extended by the filing of a new law suit. (R. at 109-111). Bybee 
also argued that the February 8th order to extend the judgment 
should be set aside under Rule 60 (b) (6) because he was denied due 
process since he did not receive notice of the ex-parte motion 
filed on February 8, 2001. (R. at 108-109). 
On March 5, 2002, the trial court filed its Ruling holding 
that the proper forum to remedy an alleged mistake of fundamental 
law by the trial court where a final order has been issued, is in 
the appellate court and not by a Rule 60(b) motion filed in the 
trial court. The trial court also held that filing a new 
complaint is the only method to extend a judgment. (R. at 175-
182) . 
III. Statement of Facts. 
1. On October 6, 1992, Fisher filed a complaint against 
Bybee and others for their failure to make payments pursuant to a 
contract for the purchase of Fisher's car wash business and for 
taking funds belonging to Fisher from the business. (R. at 1-8). 
2. The complaint was initially filed on October 6, 1992 
as Civil No. 92-0400636. On October 16, 1992, Judge Ray M. 
Harding [Sr.] signed a Transfer Order transferring the case to 
Circuit Court which assigned the case Civil No. 920-3313. When 
the state of Utah eliminated Circuit Courts, the case was 
transferred back to the District Court, and re-assigned Civil No. 
92-0400636. The two case numbers are cross-referenced as being 
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combined, therefore documents filed under both 920-3313 or 92-
0400636 are filed by the court in the same file. (R. at 39-40, 
57, 160-161). 
3. On October 8, 1992, Fisher filed a Motion for 
Prejudgment Writ of Garnishment. (R. at 7-8). 
4. The trial court issued a Prejudgment Writ of 
Garnishment on Oct 13, 1992. ( R. at 20-22). 
5. On October 15, 1992, Bybee filed an objection to the 
pre-judgment writ of garnishment through his attorney and also 
filed a personal affidavit. (R. at 23-34). 
6. On October 16, 1992, the trial court issued an order 
for the release of the prejudgment writ of garnishment. (R. at 
44-45) . 
7. Bybee failed to file an answer to the complaint, and 
on March 31, 1993, Entry of Default was filed against Bybee. (R. 
at 64-65) . 
8. On May 10, 1993, a default judgment was filed against 
Bybee. (R. at 70-71). 
9. On May 12, 1993, notice of the entry of the default 
judgment was mailed to Bybee. (R. at 72-75) . 
10. On February 5, 1997, in an attempt to collect on the 
judgment, Bybee was served with a Motion and an Order for 
Supplemental Proceedings. (R. at 76). 
11. Fisher was unsuccessful in several attempts to collect 
6 
on the judgment. (R. at 86-87). 
12. On February 8, 2001, Fisher filed an ex-parte motion, 
memorandum, and affidavit to extend the judgment ("ex-parte 
motion to extend judgment") . (R. at 85-90) . 
13. On February 8, 2001, the trial court issued its order 
extending the judgment. (R. at 91-92). 
14. On February 12, 2001, Fisher mailed a copy of the ex-
parte motion, memorandum, affidavit and a copy of the order, 
which was unsigned, to Bybee. (R. at 161; See R. at 145-155). 
15. On February 21, 2 001, in order to give Bybee an 
opportunity to respond to the motion to extend the judgment, 
Fisher drafted and mailed a motion, memorandum and affidavit to 
extend the judgment, to Bybee. ("motion to extend judgment"). (R. 
at 161; See R. at 137-143). 
16. On March 23, 2001, Fisher again sent to Bybee a copy 
of the motion, memorandum and affidavit to extend the judgment. 
("second motion to extend judgment") (R. at 161; See R. at 93-99 
and 129-135) . 
17. On March 26, 2001, the second motion to extend 
judgment was filed with the court. (R. at 93-99). 
18. Bybee received copies of the motion, memorandum, and 
affidavit but chose not to respond because he believed that a 
motion was not the correct procedure for renewing a judgment. (R. 
at 112) . 
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19. On April 17, 2001, the trial court entered its order 
extending the judgment. (R. at 100-101). 
20. On July 15, 2001, Bybee through counsel filed a Rule 
60(b)(1) motion to set aside the orders extending judgment. (R. 
at 106) . 
21. Bybee argued that the February 8th and April 17th 
orders should be set aside because the trial court committed a 
mistake of law by issuing the orders because a judgment can only 
be extended by the filing of a new complaint and not by motion. 
(R. at 109-111). 
22. He also argued that the February 8th order to extend 
the judgment should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(6) because 
Bybee was denied due process since he did not receive notice of 
the ex-parte motion filed on February 8, 2001. (R. at 108-109). 
23. On March 5, 2002, the trial court filed its Ruling on 
Bybee's Rule 60(b) (1) motion holding that the proper forum to 
remedy an alleged mistake of fundamental law by the trial court 
where a final order has been issued, is an appellate court and 
not a Rule 60(b) motion filed in the trial court. The trial court 
also held that the only method to renew a judgment is the filing 
of a new complaint. (R. at 175-182) . 
24. On May 8, 2002, Bybee filed a notice of appeal of the 
entire order of the trial court. (R. at 186-187). 
25. On May 16, 2002, Fisher filed a notice of cross appeal 
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of that portion of the trial court's order holding that the 
renewal of a judgment is only accomplished through the filing of 
a complaint. (R. at 193-194). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Rule 60(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. P. is not the proper vehicle to 
challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court. 
The trial court was correct in holding that the proper forum 
to remedy a mistake of fundamental law by a trial court where a 
final order has been issued, is an appeal to the appellate court 
or the filing of a Rule 59 motion. A Rule 60(b) Motion is to be 
utilized to correct inadvertent judicial oversight not to remedy 
a mistake of law by the trial court. A fundamental mistake of law 
by the trial court is to be redressed by an appeal or a motion 
for new trial. Franklin Covey, at p. 456-7. 
Prior to the Franklin Covey decision, a Rule 60(b) motion 
was the proper vehicle to challenge an alleged mistake by the 
trial court in fundamental law. Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 
277 (Utah App. 1995) . However, Franklin Covey changed the law. 
The Franklin Covey court determined that a "mistake" entitling an 
appellant to challenge a trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) 
motion does not include the trial court's fundamental 
misconception of the law. The policy behind the appellate court's 
decision is to prevent a party from escaping the consequences of 
failing to file a timely appeal. Otherwise, a party who failed to 
make a timely appeal challenging the trial court's conception of 
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the law would avoid the consequence of losing the right to appeal 
by filing a Rule 60(b) motion. Thus, Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure requiring that an appeal be filed within 
3 0 days after a final judgment is entered would be meaningless 
when alleged errors of law by the trial court are presented to 
appellate courts. 
Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically provides that the court may alter or amend the 
judgment if there is an error in law by filing a motion within 10 
days after the entry of judgment. If a party can challenge an 
alleged mistake of law by the trial court through a Rule 60(b) 
motion, then Rule 59 becomes meaningless because its requirement 
to file the motion within 10 days of entry of judgment to insure 
speedy disposition and finality of cases is circumvented. 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in holding that a 
Rule 60(b) (1) motion cannot be used to extend the time within 
which to file a notice of appeal and forestall the disposition 
and finality of cases. 
2. A judgment may be renewed by motion. 
It is not clear in Utah whether a motion is the only method 
to renew a judgment. There is no statue that governs the proper 
method(s) to renew a judgment and there are no cases that 
directly address the issue. However, there is a suggestion in 
case law that the only method to renew a judgment is by the 
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filing of a new complaint. 
Whether or not Utah law requires that the only method to 
renew a judgment is the filing of a new complaint and its service 
on the judgment debtor, there is no sound reason to prohibit the 
renewing of a judgment by motion. However, there are sound 
reasons to permit the renewing of a judgment by motion. 
Utah treats the renewal of a judgment as a continuation of 
the original proceeding, with the trial court having jurisdiction 
by virtue of the filing of the complaint in the original 
proceeding and its service on the judgment debtor. Therefore, 
the trial court has jurisdiction and it is not necessary to file 
a new complaint and serve it on the defendant to confer 
jurisdiction on the trial court. And since the defendant is given 
notice of the nature and basis of the renewal action by the 
motion's pleadings which are served on him, it is not necessary 
to file a new complaint and serve it on the defendant. 
Therefore, the filing of a motion and its service on the 
judgment debtor should be, if it is not, a proper method to renew 
a judgment in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED BYBEE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE APRIL 17TH ORDER 
ON THE BASIS THAT RULE 60(B)(1) COULD NOT BE USED TO 
CORRECT A MISTAKE OF LAW. 
A, Utah case law establishes that an alleged mistake of law 
cannot be redressed by a Rule 60(b) motion* 
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Rule 60(b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in relevant part that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect;...". Bybee claims that "mistake" 
includes mistakes of law by the trial court and therefore, a 
party may challenge an alleged mistake in law by the trial court 
by filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. 
However, Utah law is clear that a Rule 60(b) (1) motion is 
not the proper vehicle to challenge an alleged mistake of law by 
the trial court. Franklin Covey, at p. 456-7. Rule 60(b) (1) is 
to be used to correct inadvertent judicial oversight and not 
alleged judicial mistakes of law. Franklin Covey, at p. 457. The 
proper vehicle to challenge an alleged mistake of law by the 
trial court is a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or an appeal. 
Franklin Covey, at p. 457. Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Bybee's Rule 60(b) motion. 
B. Requiring a party to challenge an alleged mistake of law by 
the trial court through a Rule 59 motion or by appeal 
preserves the speedy disposition and finality of cases and 
prevents a party from escaping the consequences of failing 
to file a timely appeal. 
Bybee argues that prior to the ruling in Franklin Covey, 
Utah law allowed a challenge to a trial court's mistake of law by 
a Rule 60(b) motion and that the Franklin Covey court was wrong 
12 
in changing the law. However, the Franklin Covey court correctly 
determined that allowing a party to challenge an alleged mistake 
of law by the trial court through a Rule 60(b) motion would 
effectively extend the time to appeal without the need to show 
excusable neglect or good cause. Thus, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure could easily be circumvented and would be 
irrelevant when appealing errors of law. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the 
date of the entry of the judgment or order. Only upon a showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause may the court extend the time 
for filing a notice of appeal an additional 30 days. Rule 4(e), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because Rule 60(b) does not 
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, a party loses the 
right to appeal the trial court's judgment or order if a notice 
of appeal is not filed within 3 0 days of entry of the judgment or 
order. Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
If a party is permitted to file a Rule 60 (b) (1) motion to 
challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court, it can 
ignore Rule 4(a) and file a Rule 60(b) (1) motion up to 3 months 
after entry of the judgment or order to appeal the trial court's 
alleged mistake of law. Thus, by filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, 
a party can extend the time to file an appeal without a showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause. And since the trial court 
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may not rule on the Rule 60(b)(1) motion for a month or longer 
after it is filed, a party could have 4 months or longer to file 
an appeal instead of 3 0 days as required by Rule 4 (a) . 
A Rule 60(b)(1) motion should not relieve a party from the 
requirement to file a timely appeal on errors of law by the trial 
court. Otherwise, Rule 4(a) would be irrelevant because a party 
could correct his failure to file a timely appeal by filing a 
Rule 60(b)(1) motion. To prevent a party from avoiding the 
consequences of failing to file a timely appeal under Rule 4 (a) , 
a challenge to an alleged mistake of law by the trial court 
should not be a basis for relief under Rule 60(b) (1) . 
....The policy behind such a reading of [Rule] 
60(b) is clear; parties should not be allowed to 
escape the consequences of their failure to file a 
timely appeal by addressing questions of law to 
the trial court for reconsideration. That is the 
function of appellate.... (Emphasis added). 
Franklin Covey at p. 456-457, Quoting Parke-Chapley Constr. Go. 
v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 1989). 
If "mistake" includes an error of law by the trial court, 
then Rule 60(b) also undermines Rule 59(a)(7) and makes it 
irrelevant. Rule 59(a) (7) provides that a party may request the 
trial court to grant a new trial, to amend the judgment or to 
direct that a new judgment be entered if there has been an error 
in law. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 59(a)(7). Rule 59(b) also insures 
the speedy disposition and finality of cases by requiring the 
motion to be filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment. 
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Contrarily, under Rule 60(b)(1) a party can file a motion 90 
days after entry of judgment. Thus, a party would not file a Rule 
59(a)(7) motion because Rule 60(b)(1) provides an additional 80 
days to file a motion challenging an alleged mistake of law by 
the trial court. Thus, the speedy disposition and finality of 
cases insured by Rule 59(b) is lost. 
A contrary view, that 'mistake' means any type of 
judicial error, makes relief under the rule for 
error of law as extensive as that available under 
Rule 59(e), which permits motions to 'alter or 
amend judgments.' Obviously any such motion 
presupposes a mistake. Indeed, the argument 
advanced is that a broad construction of 'mistake' 
beneficially extends the ten-day limit for motions 
under Rule 59(e). Calling this a benefit loses 
sight of the complementary interest in speedy 
disposition and finality, clearly intended by Rule 
59. Attempts to allay criticism on this score by 
saying that the 'reasonable time' for filing a 
Rule 60(b) motion when it seeks reconsideration on 
a point of law is the appeal period, are an 
acknowledgment of the extent to which this 
construction of mistake undermines Rule 59 (e) . 
They also overlook the fact that subsection (2) of 
Rule 60(b), permitting a motion for new trial to 
be filed after the ten days specified in Rule 
59(b), requires a showing why it could not have 
been filed earlier. If by 'mistake' the rule 
contemplates motions for. reconsideration of pure 
points of law, there is no comparable requirement 
of diligence, although, prima facie, there would 
seem to be even less reason for delay. 
Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1267-814 (1st Cir.1971). 
A majority of federal courts have also held that a Rule 
69(b) motion is not the proper vehicle to challenge an alleged 
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mistake of law by the trial court.1 Silk v. Sandoval, at p. 
1267. (" [i]f a court merely wrongly decided a point of law, that 
is not '[mistake], inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect.'); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 156, 158-159 (3rd Cir. 
1988) ("legal error, without more, cannot justify granting a Rule 
60(b) motion."); United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312 
(4th Cir. 1981) ("Rule 69(b) does not authorize a motion merely 
for reconsideration of a legal issue...Where the motion is 
nothing more than a request that the district court change his 
mind,...it is not authorized by Rule 60(b)."); Parke-Chapley 
Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 914-915 & n. 7 (7th 
Cir. 1989)("this Court, however, has held that an appeal or 
motion for a new trial, rather than a FRCP 60(b) motion, is the 
proper avenue to address mistakes of law committed by the 
judge."); Spinar v. Board of Regents of South Dakota, 7 96 F.2d 
1060, 1062, (8th Cir. 1986) ("In other words, the motion asserts 
that the District Court made a legal error. So construed, the 
motion does not set forth a ground for relief cognizable under 
Rule 60 (b) .") . 
Other Federal Courts allow a challenge to alleged mistakes 
of law through Rule 60(b)(1) motions but only if the motion is 
interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 
"substantially similar" to the federal rules. Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT 75, % 26, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah, Sep 22, 2000). 
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filed within the period for filing a timely appeal. International 
Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 669 (2nd Cir. 1977) ("a 
motion for relief from such judicial mistakes under Rule 60(b)(1) 
may not be made after the time for appeal has elapsed"); Pierce 
v. United Mine Workers, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1985)("this 
court has recognized a claim of legal error as subsumed in the 
category of mistake under Rule 60(b)(1) . [citation omitted] a 
Rule 60(b) (1) motion based on legal error must be brought within 
the normal time for appeal."); Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231, 
234-235 (6th Cir. 1983)(time limit is needed to preserve time 
limit of Rule 59 and to reserve finality of judgments.); Morris 
v. Adams-Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1358-1359(10th Cir. 
1985) ( [W]e have recognized that in some instances relief has been 
granted under 60(b) (1) on a theory of mistake of law. [citation 
omitted] However, we are of the view that a mistake of law 
cannot be reached under 60(b)(1) where no notice of appeal was 
timely filed from the order in which the mistake is alleged to 
have occurred, and the time for filing such a notice of appeal 
had expired when the 60(b) motion was filed, a contrary rule 
would permit a 60(b) motion to serve as an appeal, which would be 
untimely otherwise."). 
Since the Franklin Covey decision preserves the speedy 
disposition of cases and does not allow parties to escape the 
consequences of failing to file a timely appeal it should not be 
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overruled. 
C. The Franklin Covey case is not distinguishable from the 
present matter. 
1). A Rule 59 motion was available to Bybee. 
Bybee also argues that a Rule 59(a)(7) motion was not 
available to Bybee as it was in the Franklin Covey case because a 
Rule 59(a) (7) motion can be utilized only after the entry of 
judgment following trial or summary judgment and cites Interstate 
Land Corp. v. Patterson 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990) as 
authority for that proposition. However, the Interstate Land case 
stands for the proposition that a Rule 59 motion may follow any 
decision made by the court. 
This court, in Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. 
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 
(Utah Ct.App.1988), held that a Rule 59 motion for 
a new trial is procedurally correct following a 
summary judgment. The court stated: " [tlhe 
concept of a new trial under Rule 59 is broad 
enough to include a rehearing of any matter 
decided by the court without a jury." While there 
may be some logic in concluding that there can be 
no new trial where no trial has yet occurred, we 
should be less concerned with what this 
"reconsideration" procedure may be called so long 
as the procedure is available to litigants. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Interstate Land Corp., at p. 1105.* 
The Interstate Land Corp. court recognized that a new trial 
under Rule 5 9 includes any matter decided by the trial court 
without a jury. Therefore, a Rule 59(a)(7) motion is to correct 
an error in law even though that error occurred in a motion. 
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Hence, a Rule 59 motion is the proper vehicle to have a trial 
court consider an alleged error in law made in a motion. 
2). The Trial Court's alleged error did not result from the 
inadvertent grant of a flawed but unopposed motion. 
Byee argues that the error in the Franklin Covey case was 
not an error of law committed by the trial court but a clerical 
error that can be addressed through a Rule 60(b) (1) motion. Bybee 
states that the trial court committed clerical error because it 
did not carefully review the grounds stated in the motion for the 
relief requested or it would have realized that a judgment could 
not be renewed by motion. 
Clerical error occurs when a judgment fails to reflect the 
court's true intent. Bank of California v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 
709 F.2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1983)(when a judgment fails to 
reflect the court's true intent, the error could be called 
"clerical" rather than legal). However, as Bybee's failure to 
cite to the record reveals, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the court did not intend to renew the judgment by 
motion. On the contrary, the fact that the trial court signed 
orders extending the judgment on two separate occasions indicates 
that it understood and intended that the judgment be renewed by 
motion. In addition, to conclude that the trial court did not 
review the motions, memoranda, affidavits, and orders would 
assume that the trial court signs orders without knowledge of the 
relief requested, the parties involved, or the grounds for the 
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relief requested, which is unreasonable and without support in 
the record. The motions, memoranda, affidavits, and orders 
specifically referred to renewing the judgment, and the trial 
court did review them. 
3). Bvbee could have filed an appeal within 3 0 days of entry of 
the court's April 17th Order. 
Bybee argues that his case does not present the same concern 
of escaping the consequences of failing to file a timely appeal 
as did the Franklin Covey case because Bybee did not have the 
opportunity to file a timely appeal since he did not receive a 
copy of the April 17th order. 
The consequence of choosing to file a Rule 60(b) (1) motion 
is that the time for filing a notice of appeal begins to run when 
judgment is entered, even though notice of the judgment has not 
been given. Workman v. Nagle Const., Inc., 802 P.2d 749,750 (Utah 
App. 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d). Therefore, the failure to 
give notice of the judgment does not preclude the effectiveness 
of the judgment, but is harmless error and notice to a party of 
the entry of the judgment is not a prerequisite to its 
effectiveness. Workman, at p. 750. By choosing to file a Rule 
60(b)(1) motion instead of a Rule 59(a)(7) motion or a notice of 
appeal, Bybee lost his right to appeal, even though he may not 
have received a copy of the order. 
Bybee argues that a copy of the order was not sent to Bybee 
in violation of Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial 
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Administration. However, the Rule specifically applies to counsel 
of the parties and does not mention that proposed orders must be 
delivered to the parties. Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial 
Administration. In any event, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal begins to run when judgment is entered, even though notice 
of the judgment has not been given. Workman, at p. 75 0. 
D. Ruling that Bybee cannot challenge an alleged error of law 
by the trial court through a Rule 60(b)(1) motion does not 
deny him the ability to present his claim to the trial court 
prior to appeal or to have his claim reviewed on appeal. 
Ruling that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion cannot be used to 
challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court does not 
deprive Bybee of the ability to present his claim to the trial 
court prior to appeal and does not cause Bybee to lose the right 
to assert his claim on appeal. 
To preserve an issue for appeal: (1) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 
844, 847 (Utah 1998). Once the issue is placed before the trial 
court and the trial court has an opportunity to consider the 
issue, the issue is preserved for appeal. Badger, at p. 847. 
Bybee, by filing a memorandum in opposition to Fisher's 
motion to extend the judgment or by filing a Rule 59 motion, 
would have specifically raised his claim before the trial court 
in a timely fashion. Once Bybee had raised his claim through 
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either a response to Fisher's motion or through a Rule 59 motion, 
the trial court would have considered his claim and his claim 
would have been preserved for appeal. Badger, at p. 84 7. 
Bybee argues that Gill v. Timm stands for the proposition 
that the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address 
a claimed error of law. In Gill, the Defendant had not pled the 
affirmative defense of mitigation of damages, did not present 
evidence of the defense, or ever request the trial court to amend 
his pleadings to include that defense. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 
1352 (Utah 1986). The Gill court concluded that mitigation of 
damages was not specifically raised nor raised in a timely 
fashion preventing the trial court from ever considering whether 
Defendant could claim the affirmative defense. However, Bybee 
could have specifically raised in a timely fashion and had the 
court consider his claim by filing either a memorandum in 
opposition to Fisher's motion to extend the judgment or by filing 
a Rule 59 motion, but he chose to do neither. 
E. The February 8th order should be set aside. 
Fisher agrees that the February 8th order should be set 
aside. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT WRONGLY CONCLUDED THAT A JUDGMENT CANNOT BE 
RENEWED BY MOTION. 
A. Utah law is not clear on the methods to be used to renew a 
judgment. 
The procedure in Utah to renew a judgment is not clear and 
there is no statute that directly addresses the proper procedure 
to be followed in renewing a judgment. There is a suggestion in 
Utah case law that the only method to renew a judgment is by 
filing a complaint and serving it on the judgment debtor. 
In Youngdale v. Burton, 128 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1942), the 
Utah Supreme Court in holding that a money judgment could not be 
renewed under Section 104-37-6, R.S.U.1933, stated: "A money 
judgment forms the basis for but two legal proceedings: (a) A 
suit thereon, brought within eight years, wherein it forms the 
basis or chose [sic] in action for a new judgment, or (b) Some 
form of proceedings in execution for collection." However, it 
seems unlikely that the Youngdale court intended by its language 
to limit the methods of renewing a judgment to the filing of a 
new complaint since the statute being considered by the Youngdale 
court specifically provided that a judgment other than a money 
judgment could be renewed by the filing of a motion. 
In all cases the judgment may be enforced or 
carried into execution after the lapse of eight 
years from the date of its entry by leave of the 
court, upon motion, or by judgment for that 
purpose founded upon supplemental pleadings; but 
nothing in this section shall be construed to 
revive a judgment for the recovery of money which 
has been barred by a statute of limitations. 
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(Emphasis added). 
Youngdale, at p. 10 53. 
Since a non-money judgment could be renewed by motion under the 
statute, it seems reasonable that a money judgment could also be 
renewed by motion before the lapse of eight years. 
Other Utah cases contain the language of the Youngdale case. 
See i.e. Yercrensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1965); Gass 
v. Huntington, Utah, 561 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1977); Mason v. Mason, 
597 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1979) . However, there are no Utah cases 
that directly address whether a judgment may be renewed by motion 
and in all of the reported cases in Utah, the judgment creditor 
has proceeded by filing a complaint and serving it on the 
judgment debtor. See e.g. Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 8 00 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1990); Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 
1988); Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah 1988); Orton v. 
Adams, 21 Utah 2d 245, 444 P.2d 62 (Utah 1968); Campbell v. 
Peter, 108 Utah 565, 162 P.2d 754 (Utah 1945) . 
B. There is no sound reason why a judgment may not be renewed 
by motion. 
Whether or not Utah case law establishes that the only 
method to renew a judgment is by the filing of a new complaint 
and serving it on the judgment debtor, there is no sound reason 
why a renewcil of a judgment may not proceed by motion with 
appropriate service on the judgment debtor. McCarthy v. Johnson, 
35 F. Supp. 2d. 846,848 (D. Utah 1997). 
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1). A renewal of a judgment is a continuation of the original 
proceedings and therefore may proceed by motion. 
Other jurisdictions have held that a judgment may be renewed 
by Motion. 
...the revival of a judgment may be ordered on 
motion, application, or affidavit, provided the 
judgment debtor,..., is given due and sufficient 
notice of such motion or application and an 
opportunity to contest it. As a general rule, this 
remedy is not a substitute for, but is in addition 
to, an action on the judgment..., and has been 
regarded as a continuation of the original suit. 
50 C.J.S., Judgments §653, p.196 (1997) (Citations omitted). 
Utah treats a renewal of a judgment as a continuation of the 
original proceedings 
However, we believe the better line of reasoning, 
which is followed by Utah and the majority of 
American jurisdictions, treats a renewal action as 
simply a continuation of the original proceeding. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Von Hake court further stated: 
Under Utah law, "[a] renewal is not an attempt to 
enforce, collect, or expand the original 
judgment." Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 8 00 
P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (holding that an action 
to renew a judgment against a debtor does not 
violate the automatic stay provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code). Instead, in seeking to renew a 
judgment, a party is "only trying to maintain the 
status quo by preventing the judgment's lapse 
under the statute of limitations." Id. Accord-
ingly, Utah law treats a renewal action, at least 
in other contexts, as merely a continuation of the 
original proceeding and not as a new and 
independent action. 
Von Hake, at p. 196. 
Since Utah treats the renewal of a judgment as a 
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continuation of the original proceedings, there is no reason that 
a renewal of a judgment may not be accomplished by motion. And to 
require that the only method to renew a judgment is the filing of 
a new complaint is placing form over substance. 
The reasons for requiring the filing of a complaint and 
serving it on the defendant is to confer jurisdiction upon the 
trial court and to give the defendant "fair notice of the nature 
and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the 
type of litigation involved." Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 3(b); 
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955) . 
However, where a proceeding is considered to be a 
continuance of the original proceeding, there is no need to file 
a new complaiint and serve it on the defendant to confer 
jurisdiction on the trial court. Von Hake, at p. 196. The trial 
court has jurisdiction by virtue of the filing of the complaint 
and its service on the defendant in the original proceeding. Von 
Hake, at p. 196. And the motion documents being served on the 
defendant insures that the defendant is given notice of the 
nature and basis of the claim and a general indication of the 
type of litigation involved. 
Because Utah law recognizes that a renewal proceeding is a 
continuation of the original proceeding, that the trial court has 
jurisdiction in a renewal proceeding by virtue of the original 
complaint being filed and served on the judgment debtor, and that 
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the judgment debtor receives notice that the judgment creditor is 
seeking to renew the judgment by being served with the motion 
documents, there is no sound reason why a judgment may not be 
renewed by motion. 
There are additional reasons to permit a renewal of a 
judgment by motion. First, there is a savings of the fees to file 
the complaint and the costs of drafting a new complaint which is 
normally greater than the cost of drafting a motion. Second, 
there is a savings of time and costs by the court as well as by 
the parties associated with the prosecution of the claims in a 
complaint. The drafting of the documents for a motion and the 
hearing on that motion require less time and costs to complete 
than the filing of a complaint, performing discovery, preparing 
and filing a motion for summary judgment, preparing for trial, 
and conducting the trial. Thus, there is less time expended by 
the parties and the court and less expense for the parties if a 
judgment may be renewed by motion. 
Other jurisdictions, have used scire facias proceedings to 
renew a judgment. Bank of Edwardsville v. Raffaelle, 3 81 111. 
486, 45 N.E.2d 651, 653 (1942); State v. Kirkwood, 361 Mo. 1194, 
239 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1951); Berly v. Sias, 255 S.W.2d 505, 508 
(Tex. 1953); Kronstadt v. Kronstadt, 238 N.J.Super. 614, 570 A.2d 
485, 487-88 (1990); Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 46 S.E.2d 
570, 574 (1948) . 
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We agree with the conclusion of law of the 
Honorable Court of Civil Appeals in holding that 
the motion to revive the judgment was a scire 
facias proceeding and not a suit for debt on the 
judgment. We agree also with their holding that a 
motion for scire facias is not an independent suit 
but is a continuation of the original suit. As a 
continuation of the original suit it is supported 
by the jurisdiction of the person obtained in the 
original case. 
Berly v. Sias, 255 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1953). (Cited by the 
Utah Appellate Court in Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 196 
(Utah App. 1993)). 
Scire facias is essentially the filing of a motion to obtain 
an order requiring the defendant to show cause why the judgment 
should not be renewed. However, even in jurisdictions where a 
scire facias proceeding has been changed to an order to show 
cause, it is not necessary to use an order to show cause but any 
appropriate motion may be utilized. 
The scire facias proceeding has been replaced in 
New Jersey by an order to show cause, R. 4:52-1 
(79 C.J.S., Scire Facias § 2), although there 
would be no impediment to proceeding by motion, 
which in this instance would be in the nature of 
motion for summary judgment, R. 4:46-1 et seq. 
Kronstadt v. Kronstadt, 238 N.J.Super. 614, 570 A.2d 485, 487 
(1990) . 
Therefore, since a proceeding for the renewal of a judgment 
is a continuation of the original proceeding, renewal of the 
judgment by motion should be a proper method to renew a judgment 
in Utah. 
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2). Bybee was served with the motion, memorandum, and affidavit. 
The procedure to be followed in renewing a judgment requires 
that Bybee receive notice of the proceeding. 5 0 C.J.S., Judgments 
§653, p. 196 (1997). Bybee did receive notice of the renewal 
proceeding. The motion, memorandum, and affidavit to extend the 
judgment were mailed to Bybee pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 
5(b)(1). (R. at 93 & 95). And Bybee admits that he received the 
motion, memorandum, and affidavit to extend the judgment and that 
he chose not to respond.(R. at 112). 
CONCLUSION 
A Rule 60(b) (1) motion is not a proper vehicle to redress an 
alleged mistake of law by the trial court. Therefore, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that a Rule 60(b) (1) 
motion is not a proper vehicle to redress an alleged error of law 
committed by the trial court and the trial court's ruling should 
be affirmed. 
A judgment may be renewed by the filing of a motion and its 
service on the judgment creditor. Therefore, the trial court 
erred in concluding that the only method to renew a judgment is 
by the filing of a new complaint and the trial court's ruling 
should be overruled. 
DATED this >> day of March, 2003. 
DARW^-&^£ISHER 
29 
S ^ ^ , 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the >^ ~day of March, 2003, I 
caused to be served by the method indicated below a true and 
correct copy of the attached and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to 
the following: 
VIA FACSIMILE 
j^VIA HAND DELIVERY 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
VIA. FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Richard R. Harrington, Esq. 
James K. Haslam, Esq. 
2696 N. University Ave, Ste 200 
Provo, UT 84 6 04 
30 
Addenda 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DARWIN C. FISHER, and CHERYL 
FISHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
G. EVAN BYBEE, DENNIS GAY, 
and, SUMMERHAWK, dba CITIOIL, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 920003313 
DATED: MARCH 5, 2002 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFEELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Orders 
Extending Judgment. Having heard the arguments and reviewed the memoranda of 
counsel, I now issue this ruling granting the motion. 
Analysis & Ruling 
This motion presents two issues for determination: first, is the alleged mistake of 
law by the trial court sufficient to support a Rule 60(b) motion to remedy the mistake; and 
second, is initiating a new suit based on a prior judgment within eight years of that 
judgment the only way to avoid the running of the statute of limitations or can a party 
renew the original suit through a motion to extend the judgment? 
1 
Rule 60(b) Motion to Remedy a Mistake 
Two cases decided by the Utah Court of Appeals are particularly significant in 
determining whether Rule 60(b) can be used as a vehicle to remedy the alleged mistake in 
this case. Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Udy v. Udy, 
907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995)), holds that a "'mistake of law by [a] trial court may 
support a Rule 60(b) motion.'"1 In contrast, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 
2 P.3d 451, 456-57 (Utah App. 2000), holds that "an appeal or motion for new trial, 
rather than a 60(b) motion, is the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law committed by 
the trial judge, as distinguished from clerical mistakes caused by inadvertence, especially 
where the 60(b) motion is filed after the time for appeal has expired." When confronted 
with this diametrically opposite case law, what is a trial court to do? 
In my view, Franklin Covey provides the answer. 
Quoting Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 
2858 (1995) (citations omitted), the court explained: 
We believe that 
"'judicial error involving a fundamental misconception of the law should 
be distinguished from inadvertent judicial oversight...,' and that [trial] 
courts should be more willing to use Rule 60(b)(1) 'to correct a minor 
oversight, such as the omission of damages, which in most cases would be 
obvious, than . . . to correct a fundamental error of law, which in many 
cases would not be as clear.'" 
1
 Similarly, Otteson v. State, 946 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah App. 1997), recognized that a Rule 
60(b) motion could be used to correct a mistake of law. 
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Franklin Covey, 2 P.3d at 457. 
In a case where the trial court has made a mistake as to a fundamental principle of 
law and in which a final order has been issued, the appropriate forum for a remedy is an 
appellate court.2 
Applying the rule of Franklin Covey to the present case, it is clear that the proper 
remedy for defendant when the trial court issued an order extending the judgment for an 
additional eight years was an appeal.3 Use of Rule 60(b) was inappropriate. 
Motion to Extend Judgment 
As I noted in an oral ruling from the bench, the use of a motion to extend a 
judgment is improper. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 provides that "[a]n action may be brought within 
eight years: (1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any 
state or territory within the United States . . . . " This statute performs two functions. 
First, it establishes a statute of limitations for judgments. Second, and of primary 
importance in this matter, it establishes the method for preserving a judgment against the 
running of the statute of limitations. It provides that "an action may be brought" to 
2
 This circumstance is distinguished from the case where a trial judge makes an obvious 
error, such as in completing a form of judgment, which the trial court should have the first 
opportunity to remedy. Likely this analysis provides an explanation for the different results 
reached in Bischel and Franklin Covey. 
3
 Defendant may argue that the order extending the judgment for an additional eight 
years was not a final order. He would be wrong. It finally resolved, on the merits, the issue 
then before the court. Given the ruling of the court, no other relief or order was necessary. As 
such, the order was final and appealable. 
3 
preserve a judgment.4 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3(a) provides that a civil action is commenced by 
the filing of a complaint with the court. When this rule is applied in conjunction with 
section 78-12-22, it is clear that the preservation of a judgment against the eight-year 
statute of limitations is only accomplished through the filing of a civil action-the filing of 
a complaint.5 
In a 1965 ruling the Utah Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: 
A money judgment forms the basis for but two legal proceedings: 
(1) a suit thereon brought within eight years, wherein it forms the basis or 
chose in action for a new judgment, or (2) some form of proceeding in 
execution for collection. Rule 69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides that process to enforce a judgment shall be by writ of execution 
which may issue at any time within eight years after the entry of judgment. 
Thus, there is imposed an eight-year limitation period on the two basic 
legal proceedings on a judgment, without any indication of an intent upon 
the part of the legislature to extend the period . . . . 
Yergensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1965). Restated, Yergensen allows for but 
two legal proceedings resulting from a money judgment: a new lawsuit to reestablish the 
4
 Similarly, essentially all of the other sections of the chapter on statutes of limitations 
use the noun "action". For example, in a claim on a written contract "[a]n action may be 
brought within six years . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. For a contract claim not founded 
on a writing, "[a]n action may be brought within four years " Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. 
5
 Also of interest is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-46 which provides: "The word 'action' as 
used in this chapter [which would include section 78-12-22, of interest in this case] is to be 
construed, whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special proceeding of a civil 
nature." This section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include proceedings to 
appoint administrators for tax collection purposes, a statutory creation under a prior version of 
the state tax code. The section therefore only serves to clarify that an "action" includes 
proceedings which are filed with the court in the form of a separate proceeding. A motion does 
not fit this framework. 
4 
claim, or a collection proceeding. Yergensen does not recognize the use of a motion 
under such circumstances. 
Plaintiffs rely on McCarthy v. Johnson, 35 F.Supp.2d 846 (D. Utah 1997), which 
held that under Utah law a judgment creditor is entitled to renew a judgment by motion in 
the original action, rather than by bringing a new, separate action. In reaching this 
conclusion, the federal district court dismissed the Supreme Court's statement on the 
issue in Yergensen. Instead it concluded that because a renewal proceeding, or an action 
to revive a prior judgment, is so closely related to the original suit, it is unnecessary to file 
a second, independent action. McCarthy, 35 F.Supp.2d at 849. 
While there is no question that a subsequent action to enforce a judgment has a 
significant relation to the original suit, that the new action is not a continuation of the 
original suit was made clear in Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1983) (quoting 
Orton v. Adams, AAA P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1968) ("The lien of a renewal judgment attaches 
only from the date of the entry of the renewal judgment, and does not relate back to the 
date of the entry of the judgment thus renewed nor extend the lien of the first 
judgment.")). 
Finally, the court in McCarthy argued from Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193 
(Utah App. 1993), and Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 2000), that 
"[a] renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment...." 
Barber, 800 P.2d at 797; and as such, "it is immaterial whether we designate a renewal 
proceeding as a continuation of the original proceeding or as a collateral order." Von 
5 
Hake, 858 P.2d at 196. Using that language the McCarthy court concluded that a 
judgment could be renewed by motion. I find it interesting, however, that even the 
McCarthy court could find not Utah case which allowed the extension of a judgment by 
motion, but rather, cited to a long list of Utah cases where "renewal of a judgment has 
apparently proceeded by the filing of a complaint and its service on the judgment debtor." 
McCarthy, 35 F.Supp.2d at 848. While Barber and Von Hake each state that an action 
renewing a judgment is part of the original action (and thus imply that a new complaint 
may not be necessary), in each case the method followed to preserve the judgment was 
the filing of a new action. I am not persuaded that McCarthy gave appropriate attention 
to the language of the statute, where in limitations statute after limitations statute the 
express wording provides that "[a]n action may be brought " 
Conclusion 
In sum, I concluded, and ruled from the bench, that the appropriate method to 
extend a judgment was by a new action, a new complaint. In this case the court was 
wrong to extend the judgment by motion. Because, however, the correct remedy for 
defendant to seek correction of judicial error was an appeal from the order extending the 
judgment rather than a Rule 60(b) motion, I deny his motion to set aside orders extending 
judgment.6 
6
 I note, parenthetically, that this may not be the end of the issue. Certainly an argument 
can be made that the order extending the judgment was ultra vzVes-outside of the authority of 
the court. As such, it may not have the intended effect and the statute of limitations provided 
by Section 78-12-22 already may have run. That, however, is a matter for another day when 
some judgment enforcement mechanism is attempted. 
6 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiffs' counsel 
is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this £_ day of March, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
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